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Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity
Claudia Blösera and Titus Stahl b
Abstract: This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne
Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the
rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that
an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental
rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the
contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes
the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for
a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding
of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes.
Introduction
In this article, we want to examine the question ‘What makes hope rational?’
While much of the current literature on hope focuses on the instrumental
rationality of hope, we suggest that instrumental considerations do not
exhaust the reasons we can have to hope. To make this argument, we
focus on hopes that play a crucial role in how people see and interpret
their own lives. Such hopes, even though they may also promote the inter-
ests of the relevant agent, are rational primarily because they are constitutive
of her practical identity. We call this kind of hope ‘fundamental hope’, and we
argue that the existence of this kind of hope poses a challenge to contem-
porary theories of hope.
Our argument proceeds from Adrienne Martin’s recent account of the
rationality of hope (Section 1). Martin suggests that what makes hope rational
is the practical benefit of engaging in hopeful activities. We argue in Section 2
that this instrumentalism does not fully capture the value of hope.
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In Section 3, we introduce our main claim: There are cases where it is
rational for people to hope, but where the relevant reasons are non-
instrumental. Instead, the reason to hope is the fact that maintaining
hope allows the person to uphold her practical identity. In such cases
of fundamental hope, agents have reason not to lose hope because
losing hope would require giving up important aspects of their identities.
As hope does not support the relevant practical identity in the sense of
being a means to an end but is rather a constitutive part of it, it
follows that we can have non-instrumental reasons to hope. This requires
a new understanding of hope that also enables a more convincing analysis
of the question of when it is rational to lose hope. In Section 4, we con-
sider whether our analysis also sheds light on the rationality of everyday,
‘prosaic’ hopes.
Section 1: The Incorporation Thesis
Traditionally, the philosophy of hope takes as its starting point what has
been called the ‘orthodox definition’1 or the ‘standard account’,2 which
analyzes hope in terms of a wish or desire for an outcome and a belief con-
cerning the outcome’s possibility.3
By analyzing hope as a combination of a belief and a desire, this ortho-
dox definition suggests that we have reason to hope for something if and
only if we have reason to believe in the possibility of its occurring and to
desire its occurrence. But clearly, the question of what we have reason to
hope for is not adequately answered with the advice that we ought to
hope for every possible and desirable event.
Reasons for believing in an event’s possibility and for desiring its occur-
rence do not always lead to a reason to hope for that event; what is more,
however, hope is also often supported by reasons that cannot be reduced
to the reasons that support the underlying beliefs and desires. For
1 Martin, How We Hope, 11.
2 Meirav, ‘The Nature of Hope,’ 217.
3 For an overview of historical and contemporary accounts, see also Blöser/Stahl, ‘Hope’.
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example, we often encourage people who suffer from potentially deadly ill-
nesses, such as cancer, to continue hoping. We do so not only because we
think that their desire for health and their belief in the possibility of recovery
are rational but also because we assume that they have reason to endorse their
desire and belief.
A modification of the orthodox conception has recently been advanced
by Adrienne Martin’s defense of the ‘Incorporation Thesis’.4 On this
picture, hope involves more than a person’s desiring an outcome and believ-
ing that it is possible. That person must also see herself as justified in endor-
sing those beliefs and desires as reasons for pursuing valuable activities such
as planning and fantasizing. This more complex analysis promises to offer
further resources for explaining hope’s rationality. Because Martin avoids
the pitfalls of the orthodox definition, her account deserves further atten-
tion. We raise an objection to her theory in Section 2, and, on this basis,
we propose a characterization of the rationality of hope that makes room
for non-instrumental reasons to hope.
Martin first describes a number of feelings and activities that she
assumes to be characteristic of hope. In particular, these are the activities
of planning, where possible, for the outcome (although usually with a
backup plan) and fantasizing about it (that is, imagining it as part of a
narrative with an egoistic function). These activities are usually
accompanied by certain feelings (like anticipation).5 Martin subsequently
defines hope as a combination of attitudes that are such that an agent
stands ready to justify her engaging in such activities (or is disposed to
do so).6 In contrast to the orthodox definition, it is not sufficient for
an agent to believe that some outcome is possible, but not certain, and
to desire it. Rather, the agent must take her desire as a reason that
speaks in favor of engaging in the activities characteristic of hope. The
4 Martin, How We Hope.
5 Ibid., 22, 25ff., 29ff.
6 Ibid., 24, 36.
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Incorporation Thesis thus amounts to the claim that hope in the fullest
sense7 involves four elements:
1. An agent who hopes is attracted to the outcome.
2. The agent believes the outcome to be possible, but not certain.
3. The agent treats her belief about the possibility and uncertainty of the
outcome’s occurring as licensing activities characteristic of hoping
(planning, fantasizing, and entertaining feelings like anticipation).
The possibility of the outcome is treated not as a reason to hope
but as an ‘enabling condition’ for other reasons.8 This does not
require that the agent change her beliefs about the probability of
the outcome. It only requires that she see her beliefs as not advising
against certain activities.9
4. Fourth, the agent must treat her attraction to the outcome10 (or the
outcome’s attractive features) as a practical reason to engage in the
activities characteristic of hope.
According to the Incorporation Thesis, hope involves incorporating the desire
into the agent’s rational scheme of ends. Through the concept of ‘incorpor-
ation’, Martin refers to a broadly Kantian theory of motivation, according to
which rational agency necessarily involves the capacity to reflect on one’s
desires or attractions and, as a result, to endorse or reject them as reasons
for acting. Endorsing a state of attraction means ‘incorporating’ it into
one’s rational agency and being disposed to justify one’s action by citing it
as a reason. Applied to hope, this means that a hoping person (a) is attracted
7 Martin does not aim to provide a definition of hope in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions and instead gives a ‘syndrome account’ (62) that characterizes the fullest sense of hope
in paradigmatic cases.
8 Ibid., 44.
9 Ibid., 45.
10 Martin uses ‘attraction’ as a stand-in for what is often called ‘desire’, but only in the sense of
a non-rational state of being drawn to something, as opposed to desire in a rationalist sense as
seeing something as reason-giving (see ibid., 25). She analyzes the latter, rationalist kind of
desire as the ‘incorporation’ of the brute attraction into the agent’s rational agency through
a normative judgment. See ibid., 58ff.
348 Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
ro
nin
ge
n]
 at
 04
:24
 20
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
to an outcome and (b) endorses her being attracted as a reason to perform
hopeful activities (thereby ‘incorporating’ her state of being attracted into
her rational agency).11
While the account given thus far is a descriptive account of hope, the nor-
mative question concerning when it is rational to hope can be answered by
considering which norms govern each of the components (i.e., the adoption
and revision of the different attitudes).12 While the state of being attracted is
sub-rational and thus not subject to normative governance,13 and while the
belief in a certain probability of the outcome’s occurring is subject only to
theoretical norms, the other two attitudes (licensing, treating as a reason)
are subject to practical norms, which Martin spells out as ‘norms of rational
end-promotion’.14 Taking up the licensing stance and treating one’s attrac-
tion to the outcome as a reason is, according to this norm, justified whenever
it coheres with and promotes a rational scheme of ends.15 She describes the
connection between descriptive and normative aspects of the licensing
stance as follows:
[W]hether it is successful or defective as the kind of state that it is depends on its
responsiveness to considerations of rational ends-promotion.16
This characterization of hope improves upon the orthodox definition and
its extensions in a crucial respect: It acknowledges that hope involves enga-
ging in a range of characteristic activities (or at least the disposition to do
so). The rationality of hope might therefore be accounted for not only by
referring to the rationality of the underlying beliefs and desires but also
by the reasons the person has to engage in those further activities. Martin
11 Martin, How We Hope, 25. By appealing to the notion of ‘incorporation’, Martin refers to
Kant’s claim that incentives can only determine us to action insofar as we have incorporated
them into our maxims (see Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings,
49 (=AA6:24); Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 39f.).
12 Ibid., 36.
13 Ibid., 37.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 38. Martin draws here on Rawls’s conception of a rational life plan, as laid out in Rawls,
A Theory of Justice, 407ff.
16 Martin, How We Hope, 51.
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also acknowledges, correctly in our view, that hope’s rationality is mainly a
question of practical rationality (as long as the outcome is neither impossible
nor certain).
Section 2: Beyond the Incorporation Thesis
Despite these advantages, we argue that Martin’s account is insufficient
because she adopts an instrumentalist analysis of reasons to hope. Martin
suggests that what makes the incorporation of hopeful attitudes into our
agency rational is only the practical benefit of having them. While we do not
want to deny that hope can be instrumentally rational, we argue that
there is a range of cases in which the rationality of hope cannot be
accounted for by referring to its practical benefits.
These cases involve a specific type of hope, which we call ‘fundamental
hope’. By this we mean forms of hope that play a particularly important
role in people’s lives. Imagine a cancer patient’s hope for a full recovery,
a political activist’s hope for the end of world hunger, or a religious
person’s hope for life after death. In each of these cases, the hope in ques-
tion plays a crucial role in how that person sees and interprets the world.
This can be contrasted with cases of ‘prosaic’ hope, where hope has no
major influence on a person’s outlook on life – such as the hope that the
weather will be nice on the day of one’s garden party. A useful theory of
hope must help us to understand why hopes of the first kind are sometimes
rational, since these are the cases where the rationality of hopematters most.
On Martin’s account, treating an attraction as a reason is justified if it
coheres with or benefits a rational scheme of ends.17 She illustrates this
with the following example of two cancer patients, one of whom hopes for
recovery while the other does not:
As long as [an activity characteristic of hope] promotes one’s rational ends and
does not cause one to irrationally adjust one’s probability assignment, this power-
ful hope is rational. To return to Alan and Bess, the cancer research participants:
their hopes are different not because they desire a cure to different degrees or
17 ‘[H]ope is successful as the state it is, so long as it promotes her [the agent’s] rational ends to
do these things [i.e., engage in hopeful activities, CB/TS]’ (Ibid., 38).
350 Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
ro
nin
ge
n]
 at
 04
:24
 20
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
assign different probability estimates to a cure, but because they incorporate
these attitudes into their rational schemes of ends differently. Alan invests less
in the possibility of a cure: he thinks the slim chance of benefiting from his
trial participation licenses only a small amount of positive feeling, thought,
and planning centered on a cure. Bess, by contrast, sees the same slim chance
as licensing a great deal of such investment. The point that now emerges is
that they may both be fully rational. If Bess’s rational scheme of ends coheres
with, or even benefits from, such investment – perhaps she needs such a
strong investment to keep her scheme from falling apart, and if this is so, then
her hope is rational.18
According to Martin, Bess treats her attraction to an outcome – recovery –
not as a reason to pursue that outcome but as a reason to engage in the activities
characteristic of hope. But what does it mean to say that the act of treating one’s
attraction towards an outcome as a reason to hope for that outcome is jus-
tified because it coheres with a rational scheme of ends? The answer to
this question depends on what exactly it is that is supposed to cohere with
that scheme.
There are three possibilities when it comes to interpreting this claim:
1) One could interpret Martin as claiming that it is rational to treat
one’s being attracted to an outcome as a reason to engage in
hopeful activities if the outcome to which one is attracted coheres with
or benefits one’s rational scheme of ends. This seems most plausible
in cases where the realization of the outcome depends at least partly
on the agent’s actions. In these cases, hoping is instrumentally
rational insofar as it motivates the agent to pursue the outcome
and thereby serves to promote a rational end – the outcome itself.
But not all cases of fundamental hope are of this type. In many
cases of fundamental hope, such as Bess’s, the agent cannot
promote the hoped-for outcome. In such cases, hope cannot be
instrumentally valuable in virtue of promoting its object. Further-
more, it is unclear how the coherence of the outcome with our
scheme of ends could make certain kinds of hopeful activity rational
18 Ibid., 63.
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where these activities are not directed at realizing any end at all (for
example, fantasizing). Coherence of the object of hope with one’s
scheme of ends therefore does not make the activity of hoping instru-
mentally rational in cases where hoping does not or cannot promote
its object.
2) One could interpret Martin as claiming that it is rational to treat
one’s being attracted to an outcome as a reason to engage in
hopeful activities if the end of these activities (i.e., the end of fantasizing,
anticipating or planning) coheres with or benefits one’s rational
scheme of ends. This is implausible, however, when it comes to fan-
tasizing and anticipating, which do not seem to be typically directed
towards achieving an end (they have objects, but not ends). Plan-
ning, by contrast, might very well be instrumentally valuable
because of the end it serves. That is, at least some of the activities
characteristic of hoping might be instrumentally valuable with
respect to their ends. In such cases, we want to argue that there
might still be another dimension of rationality that complements
the instrumental rationality of hope. Also, it would be hasty to
assume that hope can be made rational simply in virtue of planning’s
having some positive effect. This is because the positive effect of plan-
ning might only be contingently connected to the hope that motiv-
ated the planning. Assume, for example, that I hope to win the
Nobel Prize in chemistry some day and that I plan for this
outcome by saving a little money each month to spend on sightseeing
in Oslo when I eventually attend the award ceremony. According to
the presently discussed interpretation, my planning activity would be
justified (and thus my hope to do so would be rational) if the end of
that planning (my having sufficient resources for sightseeing in Oslo)
coheres with my rational scheme of ends. Even if I never win the
Nobel Prize, it may very well be the case that this end coheres with
my rational life plan. While the activity of planning itself might there-
fore be considered reasonable, this does not seem to support the idea
that my taking my attraction to winning the Nobel Prize as a reason to
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engage in this activity is thereby reasonable. The reasons why the
activities constitutive of the hope are justified are, on this interpret-
ation, completely disconnected from any feature of my attraction.
3) Finally, we could interpret Martin as claiming that it is rational to
treat one’s attraction to an outcome as a reason to engage in
hopeful activities if the consequences or effects of one’s engaging in
these activities or simply engaging in the activities themselves
coheres with my rational scheme of ends. The inherently pleasurable
aspect of a good fantasy, or of warm feelings of anticipation, could
itself contribute to my rational scheme of ends, and thereby be prac-
tically rational. But if this makes the hope rational, then this seems to
entail that any positive effect that my hope might have (like lifting my
mood) would make it rational, as long as hoping does not come with
significant costs (e.g., if the good mood leads me to make really
imprudent decisions). In other words, the justification for why we
treat our beliefs and attractions as reasons would then be purely
instrumental.19
At first sight, this third argument does not seem objectionable: Even
minor benefits of hopeful activities, one might think, might be enough to
make hope rational if the cost-to-benefit ratio is better for hoping than for
alternative attitudes. However, we think that this third interpretation is inap-
propriately instrumentalist in the sense that it focuses only on the beneficial
effects of hoping for the pursuit of the agent’s other ends, irrespective of the
relation of the content of the agent’s hope to those ends. The problem with
this kind of instrumentalism is that it evaluates our hoping for certain things
exclusively in terms of the question of how ‘giving in’ to the attraction would
19 To be more precise, we should distinguish between two elements of hope: first, the attitude
of treating certain considerations as reasons, and second, the activities for which they are
treated as reasons (e.g., fantasizing). As Bovens (‘The Value of Hope,’ 673) correctly
remarks, these activities and themental states they involve might be seen as intrinsically valuable
(because fantasizing or feeling good might have value). But, even on such an account, if
someone asks us why we treat our attraction as a reason to engage in these activities, we
would have to say that doing so is a means to the end of feeling well.
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affect the promotion of our rational ends, without acknowledging that there
are cases where a reasonable person might reject hope despite such benefits
and that there are cases where people have reason to hope despite the lack
of clear benefits.
To illustrate the first possibility, consider a case where practical benefits
would accrue to a person if she took up hopeful attitudes, but where she
nevertheless can reasonably refrain from hoping. A cancer patient might,
for example, consider it inappropriate to hope for a very unlikely recovery,
even if such hopes would benefit her overall. She might view such hopes as
incompatible with her own self-image as a rational person, for example,
because in her eyes they betray a deluded, self-absorbed perspective on
the world: the expression of a child-like expectation that things will always
work out in one’s favor. Adopting a hopeful attitude would be inappropriate
given her own self-understanding. It does not seem far-fetched to say that
she consequently has reason to refrain from hoping even if continuing to
hope would have positive effects.
This shows that the fact that acting on some attraction would promote a
rational scheme of ends is not by itself a reason to endorse an attraction.
Rather, one can imagine many cases where we have reason to refrain
from endorsing an attraction because it is incompatible with our self-under-
standing, even if incorporating it into our agency would promote our
rational scheme of ends overall. From the broadly Kantian perspective
that Martin endorses, the effects of incorporating an attraction into one’s
agency should not be all that matters.
The second possibility can be illustrated by considering the case of a pol-
itical activist: Even if her hoping for political change does not generate any
recognizable benefits for her or promote any ends, such a person can still
have reason to hope. We suggest that in this and similar cases, the reason
to engage in the relevant hopeful activities (such as anticipating, planning
for and fantasizing about the outcome) is the fact that these hopeful activities
are essential to the hopeful person’s being the person she is and that it is therefore non-
instrumentally rational for her to continue hoping. This suggestion will be
defended in the next section.
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Section 3: Hope and Practical Identity
So far, we have argued that the way in which fundamental hope is sensitive to
reasons is not adequately captured by the idea that hope exclusively ought to
promote or cohere with an agent’s ends.
If this argument is convincing, Martin’s incorporation thesis needs to be
supplemented: In cases of fundamental hope, the central reason to engage
in the activities and attitudes characteristic of hope is the fact that the agent
sees engaging in these activities as a constitutive part of her identity. When
hopeful activities and attitudes form an essential part of a person’s identity,
that person has reason to engage in such activities. Her reason for hoping,
we suggest, is non-instrumental in such cases: She does not hope because
this is a means to an end but because such hope constitutes her as the
kind of person she is. In Martin’s discussion, there are a few points where
she suggests a picture that is similar to our proposal, which she does not
pursue further. According to this picture, the rationality of hope is not
that of end promotion but that of upholding one’s personal integrity:
Hope might prevent a scheme of ends ‘from falling apart’.20 On this
interpretation, we cannot always assume that there is a preceding scheme
of ends into which hope either does or does not fit. Rather, the scheme
of ends is often itself partially constituted by some of the hopes of the
agent. Therefore, maintaining hope can be rational if the relevant hope is
a constituent part of a scheme of ends that one has reason to uphold.
This account of the rationality of hope avoids the objections laid out
above in particular as it allows for reasons to hope that go beyond end
promotion.
We consequently argue that, for a certain subset of hope, i.e., fundamen-
tal hope, the following analysis holds: Fundamental hope for an outcome O
is a combination of attitudes. As in Martin’s account, this includes a belief in
the possibility (but not the inevitability) of O’s occurring and an attraction
to O, as well as taking the belief component to license certain practical atti-
tudes. Also in accordance with Martin, we assume that a hopeful person
20 Martin, How We Hope, 63.
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usually takes the belief component to license (but not rationalize) feelings
of anticipation and attraction and engagement in hopeful activities. In the
case of fundamental hope, however, what justifies this incorporation of
the belief and the attraction into the agency of the hopeful person is the con-
stitutive role of these hopeful attitudes when it comes to the agent’s identity. That is, we
point out reasons for taking up the licensing stance that are not related to
the promotion of ends but are rather connected to the role that hope
plays in the agent’s identity.
To put it more succinctly, Martin argues that the belief component
licenses our treating the attraction (and the attractive features of the
outcome) as a reason to engage in hopeful activities, and that the instrumen-
tal value of our doing so makes the incorporation of the attraction into our
agency rational. We argue that the belief component licenses our treating
the attraction as a reason to have hopeful attitudes and to pursue hopeful
activities, and that the fact that these attitudes contribute to our practical
identity makes it rational to do so.
It follows that the rationality of hope is not always adequately captured in
terms of the instrumental rationality of end promotion and that we can have
non-instrumental reasons to hope to the extent that our hoping forms a
necessary part of a valuable practical identity.
Tomotivate this proposal, reconsider two cases of fundamental hope: the
cancer patient who continues to hope despite the low probability of her
recovery, and the political activist who hopes for the end of global inequality
in full knowledge of its unlikeliness. In both cases, the hopeful person can be
justified in believing that she ought not to lose hope. If this belief is appropriate,
remaining hopeful must be rational or justified from her point of view.
We argue that the primary reason to continue to hope in these cases is
not that hope promotes a rational end of theirs. The positive effects of
the agents’ hope can only justify engaging in the relevant activities when
hope itself is already judged to be rational. As mentioned above, a cancer
patient might reject hope, despite its potential positive effects, because
hoping would express a deluded perspective that the person rejects on
the basis of a certain self-conception. Contrast this case with a similar case
356 Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl
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where hope, even though it does not come with any benefits, is nevertheless
justified. If the cancer patient and the activist have good reason to keep their
hopes up, even in the absence of instrumental considerations, then this
reason must be connected to features of hope itself, not the effects of
hoping. We propose that in cases of fundamental hope the crucial condition
is that the identity of the agent must be partly constituted by a certain perspec-
tive on the world in which certain considerations count as reason-giving, and
that giving up hope would entail the unavailability of those lines of reason-
ing. If the cancer patient resigns herself to dying and the activist resigns
herself to never witnessing the realization of her political vision, they may
forswear actively anticipating the relevant outcome and spending mental
energy on it because they see themselves as no longer licensed to treat
the importance of the hopeful activities as a reason to engage in them.
Insofar as they are resigned to their fate, it is no longer true that certain con-
siderations constitute reasons for them to act. If it is true that being respon-
sive to certain reasons is constitutive of an individual’s practical identity,
then adopting a perspective of resignation endangers parts of their identity.
To the extent that they want to maintain their identity, they have reason to
resist such a change of perspective and to maintain hope. Even though con-
siderations of costs and benefits might (or even should) enter the agent’s
deliberation about what to do, the fact that the hopeful activities form
part of a person’s practical identity provides a reason to continue to hope
that may outweigh the reasons given by cost-benefit analysis.
Why does the fact that hope sustains a practical identity give us non-
instrumental reasons to hope? This is because the hope in question is not
an attitude that supports an identity in the sense that it causally contributes
to the presence of a different identity – rather, the hope is an essential part
of the identity itself. Thus, the relation between fundamental hope and
identity is not one of means and end, but one of part and whole.
We may now turn to the question of hope’s value. Prima facie, if we have
non-instrumental reason to hope, it seems that hope is also non-instrumen-
tally valuable. Following Joseph Raz, we hold that something is instrumen-
tally valuable ‘to the extent that it derives its value from the value of its
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consequences, or from the consequences it is likely to have’.21 Fundamental
hope is intrinsically valuable insofar as it is valuable apart from its instrumen-
tal value. At the same time, hope is derivatively valuable because it derives its
value from its contribution to a morally valuable practical identity. If one’s
hopes are connected to a bad identity (consider, for example, a mafioso’s
hope to make more money by becoming more skilled at blackmailing), it
certainly is not to be judged valuable. That is, even though the value of fun-
damental hope is independent of its instrumental value, it still derives its
value from its contribution to a morally valuable practical identity. It is
this practical identity that is ultimately (i.e., non-derivatively) valuable. Of
course, this also entails that, if the identity in question is not, in fact, ulti-
mately valuable, then the hope that supports it is not intrinsically valuable
(or at least it does not derive value from its supporting this identity).
The claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to hope also bears a
certain resemblance to a suggestion made by Luc Bovens. Bovens argues
that some hopes are essential to engaging in intrinsically valuable activities,
such as loving, and they can therefore have non-instrumental value for
agents.22 While this is a step in the right direction, Bovens confines the con-
stitutive role of hope to one intrinsically valuable activity, namely the activity
of love. In general, and with regards to its role in self-respect in particular,
love is an intrinsically valuable attitude that is essential to sustaining our
practical identities. However, the exclusive focus on love is too narrow.
There are other commitments that can be equally constitutive of a
person’s identity, for instance political or moral convictions, or religious
belief. All of these commitments make certain forms of reasoning available
to the agents who endorse them, enabling them to consider reasons that
would not otherwise be available. This entails that there is a plurality of
non-instrumental reasons to hope. We would like to accommodate the
fact that different people may reasonably have different fundamental
hopes, depending on their different practical identities.
21 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 177f.
22 Bovens, ‘The Value of Hope,’ 676ff.
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Because the notion of a practical identity is essential for to our claim that
we may have non-instrumental reasons to hope, we will first examine how
hopes and practical identities can be related (3.1). Thereafter, we
will then discuss considerations that make it rational to lose or give up
hope (3.2).
3.1 Practical Identities
By ‘practical identity’, we mean a set of commitments that an agent has that
single out a certain conception of that agent’s life as worth living (from the
perspective of the agent) and certain considerations as reason-giving in
virtue of that fact. For example, having the practical identity of a parent
involves certain commitments. First and foremost, there is the commitment
to seeing the needs of one’s child as reason-giving. Further, parents enter-
tain beliefs about the value of this and similar commitments and their resul-
tant actions, e.g., the belief that supporting and being prepared to make
sacrifices for one’s child are part of what makes one’s life valuable. Similarly,
one’s practical identity as a political activist might involve being committed
to certain ideals in such a way that a particular set of activities is seen to
bestow value on one’s life and certain consequences of one’s actions are
viewed as being particularly relevant to who one is.
With this understanding of practical identity, we follow Christine Kors-
gaard’s suggestion that human beings have a distinct form of identity,
namely a ‘norm-governed or practical form of identity’.23 To be able to
act, Korsgaard argues, an agent must be unified in a very specific way.
This unity is not a natural feature of agents. Rather, an agent has a responsi-
bility to constitute her unified identity. A central thought is that this activity
of self-constitution consists in choosing and acting in accordance with
certain norms and principles. A ‘particular practical identity’, Korsgaard
claims, just is ‘a set of principles, the dos and don’ts of being a teacher or
a citizen, say.’24 That is, one’s practical identity is constituted by the
23 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity and Integrity, xii.
24 Ibid., 21.
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norms of different roles that in turn provide us with ‘the sources of our
reason’.25 Furthermore, endorsing the particular reasons that are made
available through a particular role or aspect of your overall identity is a
way of valuing yourself: Your practical identity is ‘a description under
which you value yourself and find your life to be worth living and your
actions to be worth undertaking’.26 If one is to achieve the intrinsic good
of living a life worthy of one’s own respect, one must therefore endorse
one’s actions under some description. Korsgaard contends that most practi-
cal identities are not constructed ex nihilo by particular agents, but are rather
discovered by them as already available in our shared traditions. In such
cases, we have reasons to adopt and maintain our particular identities
because this enables us to ‘express the value we set on our human identity’.27
How does this conception of a practical identity relate to the rationality
of fundamental hope? Assume, for example, that you value yourself under
the description of being a political activist (which means, for instance,
that you recognize the obligation to participate in democratic politics, obli-
gations to other members of a movement, etc.) or as a parent (recognizing
certain obligations towards a child). We suggest that conceiving of oneself as
a parent or activist involves not only accepting certain obligations and per-
forming certain actions but also entertaining certain hopes. For example,
it belongs to the self-understanding of parents that they hope for the happi-
ness of their children, just as it belongs to the self-conception of political
activists that they hope for political change. Further, part of what being a
parent involves is not only entertaining hopes for one’s child – for
example his or her future success – but also seeing oneself as being justified
in doing so. Seeing some of your beliefs (e.g., in the possibility of political
change) as licensing hopeful activities and seeing yourself as having
reason to act in ways that are distinctive of hope is a constitutive part of
what endorsing such a role means. To be more precise, it is true of many
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 24.
27 Ibid., 212.
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hopes that they contingently follow from particular identities. I might decide to
pursue a career as a philosopher, and this might lead at some point in my
career to the hope that I will one day hold a particular position in the
faculty. It should be clear, however, that my practical identity as a philoso-
pher does not necessarily depend on this particular hope. By contrast,
other hopes seem to be constitutive of what it means to be a philosopher,
such as the hope that I will engage in meaningful philosophical discussions
or will advance solid arguments for interesting theses. It seems true of many
roles that they are defined by reference to uncertain future outcomes to
which the person relates in the mode of hoping. To engage in hopeful activi-
ties and to see oneself as being justified in doing so, in these cases, is consti-
tutive of one’s identity, and agents have reason to continue to do so to the
extent that they have reason to sustain their practical identity. In such a case,
the appeal: ‘Don’t give up hope!’ is highly relevant.28
While Korsgaard’s account explains why we must have some particular
identity in order to be unified agents, one could still object that particular
roles and practical identities are contingent and can be abandoned, and
that there is therefore no harm in giving up hope that constitutes a particular
identity as long as one can reconstitute one’s unity as an agent under some
other description. This would mean that it is always possible (and can perhaps
be rational) to give up the hopes connected to a particular identity. We do
not want to deny that changes in practical identity might occur and that we
might even have reasons for such changes, which also involve the loss of
hope. We discuss the question of when loss of hope is rational in the next
subsection. Here, however, we want to focus on reasons we have to maintain
hope. Therefore, we need only argue for the claim that it is sometimes
28 Of course, we should not assume that people usually consciously evaluate their hopes in
these terms. But that does not mean that these are not the reasons to which they respond in
their evaluations of their hope, even if they may not spell it out to themselves this way. When
people consciously or implicitly weigh reasons for maintaining or abandoning hope, they will
often be sensitive to the fact that giving up their hopes might result in their becoming a differ-
ent person.
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rational for people not to want to give up some of the particular identities
they have.
To better understand why we sometimes have reason to maintain a par-
ticular outlook on life that is constituted by responsiveness to specific
reasons, it is worth turning to Charles Taylor’s classic essay ‘What is
Human Agency?’. Taylor defends the thesis that part of what it is to be a
person is to engage in what he calls ‘strong evaluations’.29 Strong evaluations
are second-order evaluations of our desires (i.e., evaluations that guide the
incorporation of certain desires into our rational agency) that are guided by
‘qualitative distinctions of worth’.30 Taylor argues that, at least in some cases,
we may refuse to incorporate a desire into our agency not necessarily
because this would block us from achieving our ends (such as when we
forgo dessert to maintain a healthy weight) but because we view certain
desires as intrinsically more valuable than others. Such an evaluation presup-
poses a normative outlook on life that consists in a certain interpretation
of our self. When evaluating whether to start a family in the suburbs or
join a religious community in India, for instance, we must not only judge
which action would result in a higher overall satisfaction of our desires or
ends but also decide what kind of person we want to be, i.e., we have to
decide what kinds of desires or ends count as relevant to who we are or
want to become in the first place. In other words, we can only describe
our actions as being guided by reasons if we have constituted our self as
the kind of agent for whom certain things have a certain normative
import31 – and this means as an agent who endorses a certain vocabulary
of strong evaluations. If we are capable of performing such strong evalu-
ations – and Taylor claims that this capacity is ‘essential to our notion of
the human subject’32 – then we must have a (mostly non-articulated33)
29 Taylor, ‘What Is Human Agency?’
30 Ibid., 17.
31 See also Taylor, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals,’ 48.
32 Taylor, ‘What Is Human Agency?’ 28.
33 See also Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, 21.
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framework of worth from within which we evaluate. Such frameworks,
however, are themselves not chosen on the basis of an independent stan-
dard. Rather, according to Taylor, they are a predicament within which
we find ourselves and which we can only explore by means of interpreting
and understanding them better. That is, each decision about whether it
would be acceptable to be some other kind of agent must be made
from within the framework of evaluation that constitutes us as agents in
the present.34 This provides an answer to the question of what reasons
we have to remain within a particular framework (a question that Kors-
gaard’s account does not answer): We have reason to preserve a particular
identity and the hopefulness associated with it if the values that are acces-
sible from within our current identities disqualify taking on an alternative
to that particular identity. Only at first glance does this appear to be an
exceptional situation. Most people who endorse strong valuations –
whether ethical, aesthetic or religious – would view the possibility of
losing their responsiveness to their respective values as a loss of normative
sensibility.35 In other words, losing such an identity might make certain
values inaccessible – values that are fundamental to their being the
kinds of agents they are.36 Taylor thus identifies the conditions under
which it is neither possible nor rational to give up a particular identity
and the hopes connected with it.37
34 However, this does not mean that our self-evaluation must remain within that framework. As
Taylor notes, there is still the possibility of radically re-evaluating our constitutive evaluations: ‘in
radical re-evaluations by definition the most basic terms, those in which other evaluations are
carried on, are precisely what is in question’ (Taylor, ‘What Is Human Agency?’ 40). But he
adds that ‘[t]here is certainly no metalanguage available in which I can assess rival self-interpret-
ations […] On the contrary, the re-evaluation is carried on in the formulae available but with a
stance of attention, as it were, to what these formulae are meant to articulate and with a readi-
ness to receive any gestalt shift in our view of the situation’ (Ibid.).
35 See also Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, 19f.
36 ‘Put counterfactually, they are saying that were they to lose this commitment or identifi-
cation, they would be at sea, as it were; they wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range
of questions, what the significance of things was for them’ (Ibid., 28).
37 Ibid., 30.
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3.2 When to Give up Hope
While there are hopes that are mainly rational because they provide the
agent with some benefit (and that therefore ought to be given up once
that agent incurs more costs than benefits as a result of maintaining
them), the idea of fundamental hope also allows us to acknowledge a
broader range of issues arising from the question of when to give up
hope. If we accept Korsgaard’s or Taylor’s account of practical identity,
when is it rational to give up hope? There are two ways in which
people can acquire reasons to give up certain hopes. In the first kind
of case, people stop treating their belief in the hoped-for outcome’s possi-
bility as licensing hopeful activities either because they revise their beliefs
about its probability or because they come to view that original probability
as no longer sufficient for licensing hopeful activities. A young political
activist who views the low probability of achieving significant political
change as nonetheless licensing hopeful activities may later in life take
herself only to be justified in engaging in activities that are directed to
more probable outcomes (such as small-scale change for the better). If
this development changes the lines of practical reasoning that are open
to her and the description under which she values herself (as it often
does), the answer to whether such change is reasonable depends on
whether she has reason to preserve her ‘old’ identity in the face of poss-
ible change.
In the second kind of case, people cease to engage in hopeful activities
because they are either no longer sure that their practical identity constitu-
tively relies on those activities (imagine a parent who gives up fantasizing
that her children will be successful because she no longer takes her identity
as a loving parent to require this kind of fantasizing) or because, more fun-
damentally, they question the value of that particular practical identity itself.
In all of these cases, we can ask whether people have reason to maintain
hope, and this question does not seem to be adequately answered by evalu-
ating whether doing so would promote their ends. Rather, the answer seems
to lie in whether or not their hope is intrinsically valuable in terms of the
outlook on life that it supports.
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Drawing on Taylor, we can provide an even more nuanced description of
how we might lose hope: We must distinguish between external factors, that is,
causal factors that make us reject our strong evaluations (such as brainwash-
ing),38 and internal factors, that is, grounds of losing hope that are con-
nected to our sensitivity to reasons. There are two cases of such internal
factors – one having to do with the intrinsic worth of an identity, the other
having to do with its availability.
The first case, the case of a person’s reasonably losing hope because she
can no longer view her identity as worthy of being preserved, is to be under-
stood, following Taylor, on a model of self-interpretation: Our attachments
to values are accessible to us only under a specific articulation.39 Through
reinterpreting that articulation in response to experience, we at once
better understand and change our framework of strong evaluation. Taylor
considers the example of a person who belongs to a minority racial group
and who feels uneasy in certain social situations.40 While she may at first
describe her reaction as an appropriate case of shame in response to her
inability to ‘fit in’, thus implicitly adopting a framework of evaluation in
terms of which she constructs an identity, she might gradually come to rede-
scribe her reaction as an acute awareness of subtle discrimination. But if
identity depends at base on the framework that we use to understand our
being in the world, such a redescription will also change that person’s iden-
tity. By redescribing the normative import of the situation, she thereby also
changes the basic framework of evaluation, which might then lead her to
revise her understanding of herself. While the former self-description sup-
ports strong evaluations that are intrinsically connected to certain hopes
(fitting in better, being socially accepted, etc.), such hopes might later be
seen as pathological and submissive, in need of being replaced by other
hopes (for example, the hope of finding a community of one’s own or of
38 Taylor, ‘What Is Human Agency?’ 35.
39 See also Ibid., 25; Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, 26.
40 Taylor, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals,’ 69.
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working to make the larger community more accepting).41 Over time,
people often come to view the hopes of their former selves as resulting
from a confused interpretation of their values. They might therefore
judge that their former hopes are no longer supported by their current,
improved understanding of what they value.
An example of the second case, i.e., where an identity ceases to be avail-
able, are people in contemporary society who endorse strong evaluations
connected to identities that are no longer socially supported (e.g., the iden-
tity of a 19th-Century nobleman, or a tenured professor or unionized worker
as these were defined in the 1960s). To adopt an identity that cannot be rea-
lized is to set up standards of value for one’s own life that cannot be fulfilled,
but it is also irrational in a more theoretical sense. Such an identity is charac-
terized by attachments to certain fantasies and anticipations that entail a
commitment to a false belief, namely the belief that the hoped-for outcomes
are possible. This draws our attention to the fact that what it means for a
person to rationally maintain and endorse a certain identity is a matter
not only of having the necessary self-understanding but also of living in
the right kind of social context – a context that in such cases is not only tem-
porarily lacking but irreversibly lost.42 If such a context is missing, this does
not necessarily cause a person to lose the relevant hopes, but it provides her
with a reason to give up on them.
A particularly striking example of such a loss of hope can be found in
Jonathan Lear’s book Radical Hope (2006). Lear describes a situation in
which all hope for a particular outcome is lost as a result of the destruction
of a culture. Lear offers an interpretation of how the Crow Nation, a Native
American tribe, experienced the loss of their culture after being forcibly
moved to a reservation. As a result of their inability to engage in activities
that were central to their self-understanding, the Crow experienced a loss
of meaning. Lear argues that this loss of meaning can also be described as
a loss of particular hopes – such as the hope for success in central activities
41 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,’ 26.
42 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,’ 33ff.
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like hunting – that they took to be essential to who they were. Lear also
argues, however, that there is a kind of hope that may survive the loss of
all particular hopes. He describes the chief of the Crow Nation, Plenty
Coups, as an exceptional personality who was able to retain ‘radical
hope’, which ‘anticipates a good for which those who have the hope as yet
lack the appropriate concepts with which to understand it’.43
It seems plausible to assume that such a general sense of hope (or
perhaps better, ‘hopefulness’) could survive the loss of all particular
hopes. Indeed, Lear seems to have singled out a kind of hope that is
especially relevant in cases of changing from one particular identity to
another, and which allows for the preservation of a fundamental sense of
identity. He holds that, even though the Crow Nation was ‘dead’ in terms
of their cultural self-understanding, radical hope allowed them to survive
in more than a biological sense, as this hope embodied a belief in the ‘possi-
bility of new Crow possibilities’.44
Given this discussion, it is important to note that fundamental hope as we
have understood it thus far is not identical to radical hope, because we con-
ceive of fundamental hope as constitutive of one’s particular practical iden-
tity. Lear’s analysis draws attention to the fact that it might be helpful to
distinguish between particular fundamental hopes (of which there can be
many) that are constitutive of one’s particular practical identity and a
general kind of fundamental hope that is constitutive of one’s practical iden-
tity in the most general sense.
This discussion additionally shows that hopes can be reasonable or
unreasonable independently of whether they provide any benefit to the
agent. This does not mean that unreasonable hopes are strictly irrational:
A person can be non-culpably mistaken about whether her hopes are achiev-
able or about whether her identity is indeed valuable. She can therefore be
justified in hoping even though, from the perspective of an outsider who
recognizes her mistaken beliefs, she might have no reason to do so.
43 Lear, ‘Radical Hope,’ 103.
44 Lear, ‘Radical Hope,’ 98.
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Section 4: Prosaic Hope
One might object that our arguments for the claim that reasons for having
and giving up hope are best understood in terms of practical identities rest
on carefully selected examples. It is certainly true that all of us harbor many
‘prosaic’, everyday hopes that are not in any obvious sense constitutive of
who we are. This does not mean, however, that these hopes are not respon-
sive to reasons connected to our practical identities. First of all, the lack of
connection might simply mean that we are not positively justified in main-
taining these hopes in the face of countervailing reasons. This does not
amount to saying that they are irrational. They become irrational only
when we insulate them from countervailing reasons. The fact that many
of our hopes are not constitutive of our identities might simply mean that
these are not hopes we ought to sustain.
Second, it is true that, if understood as tokens of a mental attitude, many
prosaic hopes (such as the hope that the weather will be good tomorrow)
are not rational in virtue of the role they play in our practical identities.
However, the fact that we are disposed to develop hopes of a certain type
with some regularity and reliability under the right circumstances is often
indeed essential to our being the kinds of people we are. When it comes
to adequately performing the role of a parent, no particular instance of
hope that one’s child will succeed in some activity is essential or irreplace-
able. But certainly, a certain disposition to develop such hopes is indeed
essential to properly performing the role of a parent. On the same note,
even a committed political activist does not stand under an obligation to
hope for a positive outcome with regard to any particular sequence of
events. It might nonetheless be constitutive of their identity, however, to
be able to develop hope when confronted with an appropriately attractive
political movement. Finally, even the hope that the weather will be nice
tomorrow might be an actualization of a certain hopeful perspective on
life and of a disposition to hope without which a person would be so radically
different (in a normatively significant sense) that she has reason to protect
and sustain her ability to hope in this way. Furthermore, in cases of prosaic
hope it is especially evident that one’s hope cannot be rationalized in terms
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of end promotion, since those who are less susceptible to this kind of hope
often pursue their goals as effectively as those who hope (and thus are more
vulnerable to disappointment).
Section 5: Conclusion
Against Martin’s incorporation account, we have argued that we cannot
properly view reasons for hoping as exclusively instrumental reasons of
rational end promotion. Instead, we have laid out an alternative analysis,
according to which the reasons to which at least an important subclass of
hopes are responsive (if they are rational hopes) are the reasons we have
in virtue of having a particular practical identity. Those reasons can make
it rational to continue to hope. We do not want to claim that hope is only
rational in terms of what it preserves – it can also be valuable to adopt a
hopeful attitude. An account of reasons for acquiring new hopes and
their relation to our practical identity must be left for another occasion.
Thus, our account of reasons for hope is certainly not exhaustive. When it
comes to a phenomenon as complex as hope, no single analysis can
capture all the aspects of its role in human life. What our account empha-
sizes is that reasons for hope are not exhausted by instrumental consider-
ations. What makes the life of the hopeful person better is not that she is
more effective but that hope enables her to remain the person she is.45
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